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1929

RECENT CASES
AGENCY-EMERGENCY POWER OF AGENT TO SUMMON MEDICAL AID FOR
INJURED EMPLOYEES OF PRINCnAL-An employee of the defendant company hav-

ing been injured in the performance of his duties, the defendant's superintendent
called the plaintiff, a physician, to attend the injured man. The plaintiff presented a bill for his services to the company, which it refused to pay on the
ground that its superintendent had no authority to bind the company. Held,
that the plaintiff could not recover in the absence of evidence that the work was
of a hazardous nature or that the injury was an emergency demanding immediate attention. Sheehan v. Elliot Mfg. Co., 145 At. 139 (N. H. 1929).
Were it possible to maintain successfully that an employer is under a legal
duty to care for injured employees, it perhaps could be argued that a superintendent's authority to manage the business contained an implication that he was
to employ medical aid to attend such cases. Although the courts as yet have not
extended their legal sanction to this proposition, they have endeavored, due to
the obvious justice of the result, to devise other methods to uphold such contracts for medical services. In the principal case, for instance, it is to be noted
that the court would have granted the power to bind the company had the work
been of a hazardous nature and had the injury to the employee been such as to
throw him upon the mercy of the company to obtain assistance. The view
herein expressed is perhaps more historical than rational; it would seem to be
an outgrowth of the circumstances surrounding the early development of this
doctrine. The large majority of cases first to present the question were those
involving railways, a hazardous and perilous type of work in which a large percentage of the injuries suffered are of an emergency nature and received when
the employee is far removed from home. It was widely held as a result of this
situation that a division superintendent or manager of a railway had implied
authority to summon medical aid; ' and in a leading and much cited case' the
doctrine was announced that any inferior official, when he is the highest officer
of the company on the scene of the accident, may, due to the necessity for quick
action, be vested with power to act for the company in summoning a physician to
administer such aid as is imperative.' Later, when the courts began to extend
this doctrine beyond the field of railway cases, they seemed to have carried over
from the fact that railway work was said to be peculiarly dangerous, the idea
'For a discussion of the master's duty to provide medical aid or care for
his servant see Bohlen, The Moral Daty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (i9o8) 56 U. OF PA. L. REv. 217, 316; note (i9o6) 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 49.
'Toledo, Wabash and Western R. R. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill. I88 (1886);
Pacific R. R. v. Thomas, i Kan. 256 (1887); Walker v. Great Western R. R.,
L. R. 2 Ex. 228 (1867); see Sevier v. Birmingham S. & T. R. R., 92 Ala. 258,
260, 9 So. 405, 405 (891).
Contra: Marquette and Ontonagon R. R. v. Taft,
28 Mich. 289 (1873).
3

Terre Haute and Indianapolis R. R. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358 (1885).
'"The authority incident to the position is such, and such only, as the emergency imperatively creates." Terre Haute and Indianapolis R. R. v. McMurray,
supra note 3 at 36o. Thus the authority would not extend to the employing of a
second physician when one was sufficient: Louisville, New Albany and Chi. R. R.
v. Smith, 121 Ind. 353, 22 N. E. 775 (1889) ; nor to the authorization of treatment other than first aid: Aimone v. Chi., Milwaukee and St. Paul R. R., 182
(IOI)

102

UNIVERSITY

OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

that the basis of the doctrine lay in the hazard involved as well as in the emergency, and thus to have arrived at the conclusion that the doctrine applied only
to hazardous industries.5 If the theory which the court is applying in the instant
case is actually one of emergency powers, as it apparently is from the language
of the authorities relied upon, it would seem that in the interest of clear reasoning the court should recognize that the element of hazard is a probable, yet
non-essential factor, and that the power which the agent exercises is actually a
creature and result of the emergency alone.
AsSOCIATIONs-CouRT--FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATION HAVING ALIEN MEaBERs-An alien brought this action in a federal court in New York against an unincorporated association 1 organized under
the laws of that state. The lower court, first holding that all the members of
an unincorporated association must be used individually, decided that they were
without jurisdiction in view of the fact that thirty-three members of the association were aliens-the accepted rule being that federal jurisdiction will not extend to suits where both parties to the suit include aliens. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus it was contended that the
association could and should be treated as a legal entity having such citizenship
in the state of New York as would confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts.
Held (one judge dissenting), that an unincorporated association cannot be regarded as an entity to which citizenship may be ascribed. Ex parte Edelstein,

3o F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
This case presents a new phase of the problem whether the courts will recognize as a legal entity anything other than natural persons, or groups o~f such
beings organized as corporations. While the problem is one that has provoked
considerable discussion of a theoretical nature,3 the courts in general have ad-

Ill. App. 592 (914).

In Vandalia R. R. v. Bryan, 6o Ind. App. 223 (i915),
where the doctrine was extended to the case of an injured trespasser, the court
said, "It is the inability of the injured party to obtain medical aid for himself
that gives rise to the emergency."
Salter v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 79 Neb. 373, 112 N. W. 6oo (19o7);
Holmes v. McAllister, 123 Mich. 493, 82 N. W. 22o (I9oo); cf. Weinsberg v.
St. Louis Cordage Co., 116 S. W. 461 (Mo. i9O9). Some few cases hold that
a foreman or superientendent has implied authority to bind his principal on such
contracts under a theory supported mainly by "principles of justice and the dictates of humanity." Texas Building Co. v. Albert and Edgar, 57 Tex. Civ. App.
638, 123 S. W. 716 (i9o9); Miller v. Cornell-Young Co., 187 N. C. 549, 122
S. E. 383 (1924). Contra: Harris v. Fitzgerald, 75 Conn. 72, 52 Atl. 315 (1902).
'The Actors' Equity Association.
2
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is derived solely from the Constitution and Acts of Congress. No jurisdiction is conferred over a case in which
both parties are aliens. CONST., art. 3; JUD. CODE, 24; Cunard S. S. Co. v.
Smith, 255 Fed. 846 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
'See GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW (2d ed. 1921) 50; GAREIS,
SCIENCE OF LAW (Kocourekrs transl. 1911) § 15, p. 1O4; POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1911)
OUT INCORPORATION (1929) 2.

110; WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITR-

RECENT CASES
hered to the accepted principle of the common law that an association is not to
For support of the sobe regarded as a juristic person for purpose of suit
called "entity theory" we must turn to various state statutes and a number of
federal cases. Approximately half of the states now have statutes permitting
5
associations to sue or be sued as such according to various formulas. The federal courts, in the absence of similar federal statutes have, nevertheless, reached
t
the same results.' Thus, in an action under the Sherman- Ac , the Supreme
Court permitted an unincorporated association to be sued in its own name.'
Although, as has been pointed out,' it is possible in this and other cases to base
the decision on the fact that the statutes under which such suits are brought
impliedly authorized this method of suing, the language of the courts, notably
in the Coronado Co. case, suggests that the decision may be based on the broader
0
consideration of public policy," in view of changed economic conditions. The
dissenting opinion' in the principal case seems in line with this spirit when it
states that, "by reason of . . . the nation-wide extension of unincorporated
bodies and their treatment as separate entities for collective bargaining and
dealing, new and different reasons exist for considering them as having residence and citizenship." Once an association may be sued as such, it would seem
but a short step, by analogy to the corporation, to hold, that for purposes
of federal jurisdiction, it might be treated as a citizen of that state under whose
laws it is organized and does business. This is a step, however, which has not
yet been taken, but which, it is submitted, might readily be made.
I The state courts are united as regards the general rule. Grand Int. Bro.
Engineers v. Greene, 2o6 Ala. I96, 89 So. 435 (i92) ; Baskins v. United Mine
Workers, i5o Ark. 398 (I92i) ; Oster v. Brotherhood of Firemen, etc., 271 Pa.
417 (921).
For compilation and discussion, see WARREN, opus cii. supra note 2, 542-59.
aBrown v. U. S., 276 U. S. 134, 485 Sup. Ct. 288 (1927) ; Hecht v. Malley,
265 U. S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462 (1923). Note also a similar English decision,
Taff Vale R. R. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc. of R. R. Servants, [igoi] A. C. 426.
Contra: Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' Union, 72 Fed. 695 (C. C. D. Kans. iWg6);
Brown v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 8 F. (2d) 149 (E. D. La. i925).
726 STAT. 209 (80), 15 U. S. C. A. § I (1g2).
'Coronado Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup.
Ct. 587 (i92i). This case provoked considerable discussion. See Dist. No. 22
Mine Workers v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796 (925); WARREN, opus cit. supra
note 2, 648 et seq.
9

WARREN,

ibid.

" Taft, J., at p. 390, "As a matter of substantive law all the members . . .
are liable to suit and recovery, and the only question is whether when they have
voluntarily and for purposes of acquiring concentrated strength and faculty of
quick unit action and elasticity, created a self-acting body with great funds, they
may not be sued as this body."
Manton, J., at p. 639.
' After an early hesitancy, the Supreme Court finally held it to be an irrebuttable presumption that a corporation had a fictitious citizenship from the
state of its incorporation. Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R., i6 How. 34 (U. S.

1853).
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AUTOMOBILES-AcTs IN EmEoGENcY-LIAILITY FOR INJURIES TO THnwI
PERSON IN AVOIDING CoLLISION-A, operating an automobile negligently,

creates a situation which threatens a collision with the carefully driven car
of B. In his effort to avoid the collision B runs his car upon a safety zone
and injures C. C sues B. Held, that C may not recover. Queen v. Manheim,
120 So. 486 (La. 1929).
The courts have always held without qualification that necessity and
emergency 1 have justified and excused actions which would ordinarily entail
legal liabilityY In conformity with this doctrine there has been formulated the
general rule that an automobile driver will not be legally liable if, while driving
carefully, he is, suddenly placed in a position of imminent peril and to avoid
a collision acts under the circumstances as an ordinarily prudent man, and in
so doing injures another who in no way contributed toward the perilous situation.3 The view is especially equitable because of the fact that it is a legal
duty of an operator of a motor vehicle confronted with danger, though it
arises from the fault of another, to seek to avoid a collision.' This sudden
emergency doctrine is not an exception to the general rule of negligence, the
emergency being considered in determining whether due care was used under
the circumstances.' In order, however, that the excuse of emergency may be
available, it must be proved that there was in fact an emergency,' or such an
appearance of danger as would lead a reasonable man to believe that such
peril threatened.7 The emergency rule, on the other hand, may not be invoked
as a relief from liability by a driver whose negligence contributed toward creating the emergency,' or who did not exercise reasonable care under the cir'Bishop, J., in Burger v. Omaha, etc., Ry. Co., 139 Iowa 645, 655, 117
N. W. 35, 38 (19o8): "According to the lexicographers, an emergency is a
sudden or unexpected happening or occasion calling for immediate action."
'Donahue v. Kelly, I8I Pa. 93, 37 AtI. I86 (1897) ; Munson, J., in Ploof
v. Putnam, 8I Vt. 471, 474, 71 Atl. 188, 189 (19o8) : "There are many cases
in the books which hold that necessity, . . . will justify entries upon land
and interference with personal property that would otherwise have been trespasses."; PouLocx, TORTS (Ilth ed. 192o) 170; Bohlen, Incomplete Principle to

Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality (1926)
39 HARV. L. REV. 3o7; Note (19o9) 9 COL. L. REv. 621.
'Wollaston v. Stiltz, 31 Del. 273, 114 Atl. 198 (1921) ; Denkers v. Powers,
230 Mich. 237, 2o2 N. W. 989 (1925) ; Wilson v. Roach, lol Okla. 30, 222 Pac.
1000 (1924).

"Hagenah v. Bidwell, 46 Cal. App. 556, 56o, 189 Pac. 799, 8O (1920).
'Gravel v. Roberge, 125 Me. 399, 134 At. 375 (1926).
'Massie v. Barker, 224 Mass. 42o, 113 N. E. i9g (1916) (dog running
in front of auto does not create emergency as excuse for injury to human
being).
'See Hall v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co., 240 S. W. 175, 177 (Mo. 1922)
(case dealing with emergency as excuse for contributory negligence).
'Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co., 159 Iowa 52, 14o N. W. 225
(1913); Adams v. Parrish, 189 Ky. 628, 225 S. W. 467 (I92O); Allen v.
Schultz, lO7 Wash. 393, 181 Pac. 916 (1919); Fullerton, J. in Simonson v.
Huff, 124 Wash. 549, 556, 215 Pac. 49, 52 (1923): "The rule is applicable to
those who are themselves without fault, not those who are at the time committing a wrong."

RECENT CASES
cumstances when faced with the perilous situation.' The decision in the instant
case clearly indicates a judicial appreciation of the inability of the human
mind and body to function normally under the stress and strain of circumstances
threatening serious injury to person or property.
OF EVIDENCE OF NoN-AccEss-EFFECT 0N PRELEGrrImAcY-Plaintiff, a married woman, brings suit for seduction. Jury were instructed that in awarding damages they were to consider
pain and anguish plaintiff suffered at childbirth as well as the seduction. At
the time the alleged illicit acts were taking place, plaintiff was keeping company with the man she married a short time before giving birth to her child.
Held, that plaintiff could not recover for pains suffered at childbirth since to
allow mother and husband to deny parentage of child would be to bastardize
a child born in wedlock. Kreighbaum v. Dinsmore, 165 N. W. 526 (Ind. 1929).
The court reached their decision by the use of the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate, and by applying to this presumption the
rule of evidence which precludes the "parents" of the child from testifying
as to non-access. " The presumption of legitimacy can be traced back to the
very earliest writers on the common law. Originally the presumption was
rigidly applied, and only the strongest evidence could rebut the conclusion of
legitimacy, but the modern tendency is to relax the former strict application.6
Long after this presumption had become an integral part of the law and even
after the courts had permitted the type of evidence which would rebut legitimacy to be enlarged, the rule of evidence which prevented the mother and
her husband, from testifying as to non-access was first enunciated. As announced, the rule was merely a dictum of Lord Mansfield,' who supported it
on grounds of decency, morality, and public policy. Even though analytical
investigators have severely criticised the rule from a logical viewpoint,7 it
BASTARDY-ADMISSION

SUMPOiI

OF

' Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co.; Allen v. Schultz, both supra note
8; Hood v. Stowe, 191 App. Div. 614, I8I N. Y. Supp. 734 (1920).
II JONES, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 28. For summary of effect of presumption see note (I919) 22 HARV. L. REv. 3o6.
2Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 117 S. WV. 842 (1915) ; Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 138 N. E. 6 (1922) ; Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige Chan. 39
(N. Y. I84O) ; Tioga v. South Creek, 75 Pa. 433 (1874) ; State v. Flynn, i8o
Wis. 586, 193 N. W. 65i (923) ; Goodrich v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591 (Eng. 1777).
32 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(1898) 398. For
historical discussion see HOOPER, LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY (1910) ; Sm H. NiIcOLAS, ADuLTERi-E BASTARDY (1836)
especially p. 5.
'At one time the only evidence admissible to bastardize a child born in
wedlock was to show that the husband or mother was "beyond the four
seas . . . " i. e., out of England. Rex v. Albertson, I Lord Rym. 395, 91
Eng. Reprint 416 (Eng. 1697).
'Randolph v. Easton, 23 Pick. 242 (Mass. 1839) ; State v. Shaw, 89 Vt.
121, 94 Atl. 434 (i915). Banbury Peerage Case, I Sim. & Stu. 153, 57 Eng.
Reprint 62 (Eng. 181I).
Goodrich v. Moss, supra note 2.
For criticisms of this rule see 4 WIGNIOPRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2063,
2064; (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 71; (1925) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 271; (1912)
25 HARV. L. REV. 746; (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 916.
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may be rationalized only if used in cases where conception as well as birth
takes place akfter marriage. It seems a fair inference that sexual connection
will result from the access afforded by marriage,' and therefore the husband
and wife might well he precluded from offering testimony as to non-access.
In cases where conception is necessarily pre-nuptial, however, it does not seem
fair to infer that coition will occur from the opportunities afforded by mere
courtship; moreover, such an inference would be repugnant to the very reasons
advanced by Lord Mansfield in support of the rule. The English Courts have
recognized that a real distinction does exist in these two situations,' and have
repudiated the application of the rule" where it would preclude the "parents"
from denying access in cases of pre-marital conception. A redeeming feature
cf this Indiana case is, perhaps that no miscarriage of justice resulted,' when
the court refused to draw this distinction and followed the other American
jurisdictions' in flatly refusing to take cognizance of the fact that there is
a vital dissimilarity in these two situations. Yet the threat is ever present, that
the court will find that they have laid down a rule which, in the determination
of some future set of facts, will exclude that very evidence by which, and
only by which, a proper conclusion may be reached.
BI.LS AND NOTEs-FRGEn CHiEcK-RIGHT OF RscovERY BAcK-Defendant
bank cashed check drawn on plaintiff bank without requiring identification from
purported payee. Plaintiff paid check on presentation by defendant and later
discovered that the signature of the drawer and the indorsement of the payee
were forgeries. Plaintiff sues to recover back the money paid on the forged
check. Held, that the drawee bank may recover. Bank of Pdaski v. Bloomfield State Batik, 226 N. W. iig (Iowa 1929).
Insofar as the problem of the forged drawer is concerned, the case falls
directly under a so-called exception to the law of Price v. Neal.' The rule, as
therein enunciated, and sustained by the heavy weight of authority,' is that a

a Opinion of the judges in the Banbury Peerage Case, supra note 5; SIR H.
NicHoLAs, supra note 3, at 183-4.
'Poulet Peerage Claim [I9O3] A. C. 395.
0
Anon. v. Anon., 23 Beav. 273, 53 Eng. Reprint io7 (Eng. 1856); overruled by the Poulet Peerage Claim, supra note 9.
'The conduct of the plaintiff and her husband was surely not beyond
suspicion. Her husband on being apprised of her. condition did not rebuke her,
hut went to the house of the defendant with a shotgun and demanded twelve
hundred dollars, precisely the amount that was due on his farm.
'Zachman v. Zachman, 201 Ill.
380, 66 N. E. 256 (19o3) ; Rabeke v. Baer,
ii5 Mich. 328, 73 N. W. 242 (1897) ; Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420 (i857).
'3 Burr. 1355, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (Q762).
'Germania Bank v. Boutell, 6o Minn. i89, 62 N. W. 327 (1895) ; Bank of
Rolla v. First National Bank of Salem, 141 Mo. App. 719, 125 S. WV.513 (1909).
Only three states have rejected the doctrine, Pennsylvania by statute, Act of
April 5, 1849, P. L. 424, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § i6oii, and North Dakota,
National Bank v. Bank of Wyndmere, 15 N. D. 2W9, lo8 N. W. 546 (igo6), and
Oklahoma, Amer. Express Co. v. State National Bank, 27 Okla. 824, 113 Pac.
711 (1911), by judicial decision. None the less, the rule has been the subject of

RECENT CASES
drawee may not recover back money paid on a forged check to a bona fide
holder. An exception to the rule permits such recovery if the cashing bank's
negligence contributed to the success of the fraud
It is submitted that the
classification of this as an exception to the rule of Price v. Neal is erroneous.
Inasmuch as the latter principle is an exception to the rule that money paid
under mistake of fact may be recovered,' and has never been applied save within
narrow limits to a bona fide non-negligent holder, it seems more logical and
would probably be more conducive of clear judicial thinking were the exception
more accurately classified as part of the all-embracing mistake of fact rule, and
the Price v. Neal principle confined to cases involving only bona fide non-negligent holders. It is interesting to note that the Negotiable Instruments Law,
except through the law merchant,' makes no provision for the case The further question of the forged indorsement involves no little speculation since it
cannot be determined from the facts whether the payee was genuine or fictitious.
While the payee was probably fictitious, a genuine payee may be supposed, assuming a state of facts wherein the stranger who cashed the check had found it
entirely filled out and had only indorsed the payee's signature. The question is
important in determining whether the cashing bank received good title to the
check. If the payee is considered fictitious, the check is payable to bearer,' the
indorsement is a mere superfluity, and the cashing bank's title valid.? If the
payee is considered genuine, then it follows that the indorsement is forged, and
much acrimonious criticism. See dissenting opinion of Canty, J., in Germania
Bank v. Boutell, supra, at 195; Woodward, Forgery of Negotiable Instruments
(1924) 24 COL L. REv. 469; 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed.
1918) § 464. The real basis, it is believed, for the rule and its exceptions, is
one of business convenience and necessity. For a thorough discussion see Farnham, Right of Recovery Back (1921) 12 A. L. R. 1O97; Ames, Doctrine of
Price v. Neal (891) 4 HARV. L. REv. 297.

3
Nat. Bank of N. A. v. Bangs, io6 Mass. 441 (1871); Bank of Orleans v.
Bank of Alma, 22 Neb. 769, 36 N. W. 289 (1888) ; Ellis v. Ohio Life Ins. Co.,

4 Ohio St. 628 (z855).

'Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 22 Atl. 313 (189o) ; Lewellen v. Garrett,
58 Ind. 442 (1877); Norton v. Marden, I5 Me. 45 (1838); I MORSE, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 9 n. 9.
'N. L L. § 196. "In any case not provided for in this Act the rules of law
merchant shall govern."
'Some courts hold that § 62 of the N. L L. embodies Price v. Neal. Bank of
Commerce v. Mechanics Bank, 148 Mo. App. I, 127 S. W. 429 (Igio), Figuers
v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S. W. 117 (1916). But § 62 refers to acceptance;
and the better view is that payment is not acceptance since payment discharges
the instrument while acceptance contemplates further circulation induced by the
fact of acceptance. Boston Trust Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 45, 143 N. E. 816
(1924) ; Hening, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1911) 59 U. OF PA. L. REv.
93. For a discussion on the need for revision of the N. L L., ibid. 497.
'N. L L. § 9 (3), incorporating the law merchant. See Snyder v. Corn
Exchange, 221 Pa. 599, 607, 70 At. 876, 884 (19o8) for a discussion of this
point.
. Iid.6o8, 7o At. at 885.
'Bank of Marshalltown v. Marshalltown State Bank, 1O7 Iowa 327, 77
N. W. 1045 (1899); Bank of England v. Vagliano [1891] A. C. lO7.
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the bank could receive no title through such forged indorsement," being consequently unable to retain the money." Had not the cashing bank been negligent,
a difficult problem would have confronted the court. Recovery would have been
denied under the Pricev. Neal rule and permitted under the forged indorsement
doctrine. Which rule is more important? No case has been squarely decided on
this point, but dicta have been found favoring both contentions.' It would seem
on principle, however, that the cashing bank should not be permitted to retain
the proceeds of a paper to which it never held title. Irrespective of these considerations, the case was correctly decided, inasmuch as the cashing bank was
unquestionably negligent.
Bn.S AND NOTES-MORTGAGES--FORECLOSURE

PROCEEDINGS

AND

LAND

RECORDS AS NoTICE OF DEFECT TO AN OTHERWISE GOOD FAITH PURCHASER OF A

NOTE-A tenant, near the close of 1925, delivered to the party from whom he
had rented, a promissory note which stated on its face, "For rent McLemore
place for year 1925." The property, in 1919, had been mortgaged and the mortgage recorded. In the early part of 1925, the property had been sold at sheriff's
sale upon the foreclosure of the mortgage. The existence of the mortgage and
its foreclosure were unknown to the tenant, who had, in the belief that the one
from whom he had rented still owned the property, delivered to him the note for
the rent of the entire year 1925, while in fact, the payee had only owned the
property for the portion of the year prior to the foreclosure sale. Held, that
the purchaser of the note without knowledge of the partial failure of consideration was not charged with constructive notice from the public records. Wible
v. Abrahan, 120 So. 474 (Ala. 1929).
A survey of the decisions involving the question of whether or not a
recorded instrument imparts constructive notice to holders of promissory notes,
affords an interesting study of the manner in which a division of legal thought
upon an early and basic subject, as the lien and title theories of mortgages, tends
to become the point of divergence in the solution of subsequent problems. The
majority of the jurisdictions, following the lien theory of mortgages, hold that
when a note and a mortgage are given for a debt, the recording statutes with
their constructive notice do not affect the status of the note holder.' The note
" Nat Bank v. Traders Bank, 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W. 986 (1914) ; Graves

v. Exchange Bank, 17 N. Y. 205 (x858) ; Ames, sufpra note 2 at 3o7; STORY,
PROMISSORY NOTES (7th ed. 1878) § 379.
"Trust Co. v. State Bank, 148 Ark. 599, 231 S. W. 7 (192i)
; Nat. Bank
v. Northwestern Bank, 152 Ill. 296, 38 N. E. 739 (1894) ; Nat. Bank v. Traders'
Bank, .rtpranote IO.
"Nat. Bank v. Traders' Bank, supra note io, would permit recovery since
the cashing bank was never entitled to the money; First Nat. Bank v. U. S.
Nat. Bank, ioo Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547 (i92I), would deny recovery on the

grounds that the forged indorsement rule applies only to genuine checks, whereas
here the check would be invalid from the beginning. This reasoning seems
vague and without either historical or logical foundation.

'Minnell & Co. v. Reed, 26 Ala. 730 (1885) ; Moorehead v. Harris, 121 Ark.
634, 182 S. W. 521 (1916) ; Metropolitan State Bank v. McNutt, 73 Colo. 291,
215 Pac. 151 (1923); Foster v. Augustanna College and Theol. Seminary, 92
Okla. 96, 218 Pac. 335 (1923) ; BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW
ANNOTATED (4th ed. 1926) 458.
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is the principal and the mortgage the accessory so that both are brought within
the purview of the laws relating to negotiable instruments, rather than that of
the statutes relative to recording and inferred notice.' Other jurisdictions, viewing the mortgage as the conveyance of a conditional estate in land, hold that the
transferee of a note is given constructive notice of the contents of public records because the conveyance brings the entire transaction within the influence of
the registry statutes.' Since, in the instant case, the note and mortgage arose
from distinct and unconnected transactions, the reasons for holding constructive
notice, even under the title theory of mortgages, do not apply,' and it was correctly held that the purchaser was not charged with notice 3 However, it would
seem that the holder of a note, whether or not the note originated along with a
recorded instrument, should not be charged with notice from public records.' Since
it is the purpose of the recording statutes to affect only those taking in the chain of
title to the land or chattel,7 the constructive notice of the acts should not extend
to the note holder, as such, for his cause of action is only on the note and not
upon a claim in the chain of title to the land or chattel. Furthermore, an unimpeded movement of negotiable paper in modern commerce requires an interpretation of the "actual knowledge of infirmity or defect" clause of the Negotiable
Instruments Law' as actual knowledge, derived through establishment of fact
rather than by inference of law
CONFLICT

OF

LAws-DvoRcE-ETRATERRiToriAL

EFFECr

OF

STATUTE

PROHIBITING REMARRIAGE-The parties, residents of New York, were married

'Foster v. Augustanna College & Theol. Seminary; Minell & Co. v. Reed
(chattel mortgage), both supra note i; (1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 337, 347.
3
Helmer v. Parsons, 18 Cal. App. 450, 123 Pac. 356 (I912); Murphy v.
Barnard, 162 Mass. 72, 38 N. E. 29 (1894) ; see Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174

(1883).
'The rent clause of the note in the instant case being a mere recital of the
transaction from which it arose, did not destroy its negotiable character. Peoples'
Bank v. Moore, 2oi Ala. 411, 78 So. 789 (1918); Simmons v. Council, 5 Ga.
App. 386, 63 S. E. 238 (I9O8). Contra: Helmer v. Parsons, supra note 3, at 452,
123 Pac. 357; cf. Cook v. Augustus, 2ol Ill. App. 195 (1916).
'In County of Cass v. Gilbert, 100 U. S. 585 (1879) is enunciated the rule
that the holder of a negotiable instrument is not affected by the pendency of a
suit pertaining to the same subject matter, of which suit he had no actual knowl-

edge. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway v. Lynde, 55 Ohio
23, 44 N. E. 596 (1896).
"Foster v. Augustanna College & Theol. Seminary, supra note I; 8 MINN.
L. REV., supra note 2, at 348.
Neas v. Whitener-London Realty Co., 1i1 Ark. 300, 178 S. W. 390 (1915);
Davis et al.v. Monroe, 187 Pa. 212, 41 Atl. 44 (1898).
'NEGOTIABLE INSTRUNIENTs LAW §§ 52, 56; ALA. CIV. CODE (1923) §§ 9078,

9082. Section 56 provides, "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to
whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith."
'Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191, 25 N. E. 402 (1890);
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) 949; note (1927) 76 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 186.
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on board ship. The defendant had already been married, his former wife having procured a divorce on the grounds of adultery, the decree providing, in accordance with the New York statute,' that the defendant was prohibited from
remarrying during the life of his former wife. Held, that the marriage on board
ship being valid where celebrated was valid in New York, the statute having no
extraterritorial effect. Fisherv. Fisher, 25o N. Y. 313, i65 N. E. 460 (1929).!
There is a decided conflict of authority as to whether a state which has a
statute prohibiting either or both parties to a divorce, granted in that state,
from remarrying within a given time or during the life of the other party, will
recognize a remarriage celebrated in another state within the prohibited time.
The decision reached in the principal case, recognizing such remarriage, is in
accord with the majority view.' There is, however, a strong minority supporting the opposite view," which prevails especially where the statute postpones,
for a time, the dissolution of the former marriage, and also where the prohibition runs against both parties, being, therefore, not a penalty. The decisions,
in jurisdictions holding the minority view, are put on the grounds that to recognize a remarriage celebrated in another state, contrary to the local statute, is
opposed to the attempt of the legislature to remove the inducement to divorce
by prohibiting either of the parties from remarrying for a certain time,' and
that to recognize the remarriage is against good morals and contrary to public
policy
The minority view, however, is most often exhibited in those cases in
which the parties are remarried in another state for the express purpose of
evading the law of the domicile,' although even in these situations some courts
LAWS (Cum. Supp. 1924) ch. 14 § 8.
'Another problem presented in this case is whether the law of the domicile
of the owner of a ship or the law of the state of registry follows it on the high
seas. The decision of the court that the law of the domicile of the owner follows the ship, it would seem is incorrect. For a discussion of this aspect of the
case see (1929) 13 MINN. L. REV. 725.
'Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa 142, 13o N. W. 785 (1911) ; State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. 81 (1897) ; Gardner v. Gardner, 232 Mass. 253, 122
N. E. 3o8 (igig) (one party was innocent of an intention to evade the law) ; but
now if either party intended to evade the law by a remarriage, it will not be
recognized in Mass. Murphy v. Murphy, 249 Mass. 552, 144 N. E. 394 (924).
'Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16 (1898) ; Newman v. Kimbrough, 59
S. W. lo6i (Tenn. igoo).
'Atkeson v. Sovereign Camp, 9o Okla. 154, 216 Pac. 467 (1923) ; Heflinger
v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316 (1923).
'Lincoln v. Riley, 217 Ill. App. 571 (192o); Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis.
36o, 117 N. W. 787 (io8). Contra: Hoagland v. Hoagland, 72 Wyo. 178, 193
Pac. 843 (1920). If the statute prohibits only the guilty party it is considered a
penal statute and the courts quite generally hold that the statute has no extraterritorial effect. See GOODRICH, CoNFLIcr OF LAWs (1927) § 114.
'Atkeson v. Sovereign Camp, surpra note 5; Lanham v. Lanham, supra
note 6.
' Stull's Estate, supra note 4, at 637, 39 Atl. at 18.
'Peerless Pac. Co. v. Burckhard, go Wash. 221, 155 Pac. 1037 (1916) ; see
Harvey v. State, 31 Okla. Crim. 299, 238 Pac. 862 (1925). In Newman v. Kimbrough, supra note 4, the marriage was invalid although there was no intent to
evade the local law.

'N. Y. ANN. Coxs.
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lean towards the majority rule' The decision in the principal case, following the
majority rule' and former New York decisions' seems proper, inasmuch as
the statute involved prohibits only the guilty party from remarrying,' and also
because it adheres to the policy of the law to recognize and uphold the validity
of marriages whenever possible, thereby protecting the rights of the innocent."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PocKET VEro-On June 24, 1926, a bill was presented to the president for approval. On July 3, 1926, before the expiration of
the ten days (Sundays excepted) allowed by the Constitution for consideration,
there was an interim adjournment of Congress. The bill was neither approved
nor returned. Held, that the bill did not become a law, Congress having prevented its return by their adjournment. Okanogan Indian Tribe, et al., v. U. S.,
49 Sup. Ct. 463 (1929).
This case presents a novel aspect of the pocket veto problem in the federal
courts, although the specific question has received official consideration by other
departments of the Government.? Owing to differences in the wording of constitutional provisions, and what would seem to be ill-considered decisions," there
is little to be gained directly from the opinions of various state courts construing
similar clauses in their local constitutions With faultless discrimination the
Court went to the point upon which the whole case turned, and reasoned clearly
oDudley v. Dudley, sispra note 3; Hoagland v. Hoagland, supra note 6.
For a case where a third state having the same statute as the prohibiting state
will recognize a remarriage celebrated in a state where it is valid see Owen v.
Owen, 178 Wis. 6og, igo N. W. 363 (1922).
Supra note 3.
'Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18 (88i); Moore v. Hegeman, 92
N. Y. 521 (1883).
' Supra note 6.
" Craw.ford v. State, 73 Miss. 172, I8 So. 848 (895).
If he approve he shall sign it, but it not he sludl return it, with
his Objections to that House in. which it shall have originated, who shall enter
the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it..
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Satdays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, wdess the Congress by their Adjouriment
prevent its Retun-, in which Case it shall not be a law." U. S. CoNSTiTuTIoN,
ARTIcLE I, § 7,CL.2. (Italics the writer's.)
'Opinion of Attorney-General Miller, 2o Op. Att'y Gen. 503 (1892) ; H. R.
REP. No. 2054, 69th Cong. 2d Sess. (iM).
3
ALAI;AmA, CONSTITUTION, § 125, construed in State ex rel. Crenshaw v.
Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942 (1911) ; ILLINOIS, CONSTITUTION, ART.4, § 21,
construed in People v. Hatch, 33 Ill.
9 (863).
'Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189 (i87o); Putnam v. Holm, 172 Minn.
162, 215 N. W. 200 (i92); Opinion, Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N. H. 6o7
(1864) ; Johnson City v. Tenn. E. Co., 133 Tenn. 632, 182 S.W. 587 (1915).
'There is but one extant case in which the reasoning and result exactly
parallel those of the case under consideration, In re Public Utilities Act, 83
N. J. L. 305, 84 AtI. 7o6 (1912).
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that a "return to the House" could mean only the House "in session. 6 Here
due regard was properly paid to constitutional mandates,' which courts in some
states having almost identical provisions' have either failed to recognize or have
disregarded. This left little question as to the proper construction of "adjournment,"9 a point on which many courts have gone astray by reading in the qualifying adjective "final."'" There being further no language in the Constitution
providing for a return after "recesses"' or for a fictitious return to an officer
or clerk of the House, it is obvious that any other result would have amounted to
nothing short of a judicial amendment.' The maintenance of our system of
"checks and balances," a result of the theory of "separation of powers," requires that the constitutional right to the fidl time granted the executive for
consideration of legislative measures be resolutely guarded'
EMINENT

DAMAGES

IN

DomAIN-Loss OF GOOD WnL
CONDEMNATION

EXCLUDED AS AN ELEMENT OF

PROCEEDINGs-The plaintiff was the lessee of

property, taken for street widening purposes by the defendant, the City of Newark. As a result of the taking of the property, the plaintiff's retail business
conducted thereon was destroyed, depriving him of a good will built up in connection with the business. Held, that the rule of damages for taking land for
highways does not include compensation for loss of good will, Haas v. City of
Newark, 146 AUt. 50 (N. J. 1929).
The general rule seems to be settled that good will is not property within the
meaning of statutes relating to eminent domain, consequently damages cannot be
allowed for loss of good will built up in connection with property taken for public
6 See State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Joseph, mtpr note 3, at 586, 57 So.
at 944;
State ex reL. Corbett v. S. Norwalk, 77 Conn. 257, 265, 58 Ad. 759, 762 (9o4) ;
People v. Hatch, supra note 3, at 149; it re Public Utilities Act, supra note 5,
at 311, 312, 84 At. at 710.
'U.
S. CONSTITUTION, ARTIcLE I, § 5, CL. 3, requiring each House to keep a

Journal; that part ARTicLE I, § 7, CL.

2,

dealing with entry of Objections on the

Journal. The Court pointed out that these could not be properly complied with
excepting by the House in session.
8
CALIFORNIA, CONSTITUTION, ART. 4, § I6; MINNESOTA, CONSTITUTION,
ART. 4, § ii; NEW HAMPSHIRx, CONSTITUTION, Pr. 2, ART. 3; TENNESSEE, CONSTITUTION, ART. 3, § i8. See cases supra note 4.
that which shall practically deprive the governor of ability to communicate with the house." People v. Hatch, supra note 3, at 155; see It re Public Utilities Act, supra note 5, at 312, 84 At. at 710.
"oCases supra note 4.
U Cf. ALABAMA, CONSTITUTION, supra note 3.
"It is interesting to note that the Court recognized a practical construction
based on a long-continued executive practice of failing to return unapproved
bills after an interim adjournment, Congress acquiescing therein and never questioning the right of the President to do so nor attempting to consider such bills as
laws. See I WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929)
49, § 28; U. S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 469, 472, 483, 35 Sup. Ct. 309,
311, 313, 317 (915).

'See

People v. Hatch, sup'ra note 3, at 136, 138; Tuttle v. Boston,

215

Mass. 57, 6o, io2 N. E. 350, 351 (1913) ; Lankford v. County Comm., 73 Md.
IO5, I10, III, 2o Atl. ioi7, i18 (i89o).
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use.1 There can be a recovery of damages for this loss of intangible property
only when the statute expressly mentions good will as an item governing compensation in condemnation proceedings! In an attempt to explain the reasons for
adhering to the general rule, the cases generally proceed upon two theories
which are in direct conflict. One theory develops the view that only the land is
taken, thereby allowing the business to be continued elsewhere carrying with it
the good will previously enjoyed,3 whereas the second theory recognizes the fact
that something more than land has been taken but because of the intangible
nature of good will no compensation can be allowed.' The first theory fails to
recognize the fact that the removal of a business often occasions a loss of good
will. In the event that there is such a loss caused by the taking of the land, the
owner must bear the loss as has been pointed out in the general rule. That the
second theory is questionable is seen from the fact that the courts quite readily
protect good will as property in equity cases," and recognize it as a very important item in considering the value of property in taxation. In some states
the good will of a foreign corporation is even taxable as capital employed within
the state. Because of the vital part that good will plays in any business venture
today, this very intangible property right has been properly recognized by our
courts and legislatures in other fields of the law. It should behoove the legislatures and courts to also include loss of good will as an element of damages
when property is taken for public use.
'Morris v. City and County of San Francisco, 59 Cal. App. 364, 21o Pac.
824 (i922) ; In re Sixth Street, 276 Mo. i58, 2o7 S. W. 5o3 (i918) ; City of
Newark v. Cook, 99 N. J. Eq. 527, 133 Atl. 875 (1926); Banner Milling Co. v.
State, 240 N. Y. 533, 148, N. E. 668 (1925) ; af'g 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 911, 21o App.
Div. 812 (1924) ; 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 19o9) § 727.

' Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U. S. 668 (1923) ; City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 7o5 (i915) ; Sawyer v.
Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 65 N. E. 52 (i902); Cal. Civ. Code (Deering,
1923) § 1248.

Banner Milling Co. v. State, supra note I, at 54o; Lxvis, op. cit. miprg
note I, at

1272.

"In City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., supra note 2, the court
holds: "Business is property and when the taking by the state interferes with,
impairs, or destroys a business, compensation may be recovered therefor. We
are not to be understood as saying that this should not be the law when we do
say that it is not our law. It is quite within the power of the legislature to
declare that a damage to that form of property known as business or good will
of a business shall be compensated for. It is a universal rule that injury to a
business is dainum absque injuria, and is not an element of damages." Sawyer
v. Commonwealth, Supra note 2, clearly points this out when Holmes, C. J., says:
"There are many serious pecuniary injuries which may be inflicted without
compensation. No doubt a business may be property, and property of great
value. But a business is less tangible in nature and more uncertain in its vicissitudes than the rights which the constitution undertakes to protect"; Raulet v.
Concord R. R. Co., 62 N. H. 561 (1883); Lvis, op cit. supra note I, at 1273.
,Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, io6 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887); Wilkinson v. Colley, 164 Pa. 35, 30 At. 86 (1894); POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (Student ed. 19o7) 1355.
'Matter of Jones, 28 N. Y. Misc. 356, 59 N. Y. Supp. 983 (1899). But cf.
Hart v. Smith, 159 Ind. 182, 64 N. E. 661 (192) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th
ed. 1924) § 576.

People ex reL Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70, 53 N. E. 685 (1899).
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EQUITY-INJUNCTION-PERSONAL RIGaHTs-Bill in equity to set aside divorce procured in Mexico by defendant Charles L. Bauman from plaintiff and
to annul the subsequent marriage of the defendants. Plaintiff also sought to
enjoin defendant, Ray Starr Einstein, from continuing to represent herself as
Mrs. C. L. Bauman. Held (two judges dissenting), that the divorce and marriage were void but that the court had no jurisdiction in the absence of a property
right to grant the injunction. Bauman v. Bauman, 165 N. E. Sig (N. Y. 1929).
Although courts differ in their conception of what may be included within
the realm of property rights, the vast majority agree that the jurisdiction of
courts of equity is confined to the protection of rights in property and that
equity will not take cognizance of causes involving only personal rights.' Since,
in the instant case, the declaratory judgment protected the plaintiff in whatever
property rights she might have by virtue of her marital status, the court refused
to take jurisdiction of the purely personal rights which remained. In marked
contrast is the case of Vanderbilt v. Mitchell' where the court enjoined the respondent from representing himself to be the plaintiff's son on the theory that
it was protecting a property right although it had already ordered the cancellation of the fraudulent birth certificate and in that manner fully safeguarded
all the property rights involved. The difficulty in reconciling the decisions owes
its existence to the refusal of many courts' in such cases as Vanderbilt v. Mitchell to either reject the established rule and declare openly for the protection
of personal rights or to deny injunctive relief entirely. Although there are no
property rights in peril, in these situations, it has, nevertheless, become a common practice for courts to take jurisdiction by seizing upon some doubtful right
and calling that a property right which really has no value as such. This practice, unquestionably, may be taken as an indication that the tendency is toward
the securing of personal rights through injunctive relief because that is the basis
on which these decisions must rest. Uncertainty is the only reward to be reaped
by this course, whereas either a frank repudiation of the rule' or the enactment
'Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (W. D. Mo.
i912); Chappel v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896); Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., I1 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (I9O2); BISPHAM,
EQUITY (5th ed. 1893) 584, note 2. Contra: Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99
S. E. 861 (i919) ; Pavesich v. N. E. Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. iwo, 50 S. E.
68 (19o5) ; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, I17 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (I906) ; LAwRENCE,

EQUITY (929) § 53.
272 N. J. Eq. 9io, 67 Atl. 97 (i9o7).
'Edison v. Edison Polyform and Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 At. 392
(19o7), ("and as far as my researches have extended I do not find that it has
yet been decided that injury to property in some form is not an essential element to relief. It may, at times, have been a matter of doubt whether what was
called 'property' was really such, and whether the injury thereto, actual or apprehended, was not so 'shadowy' as to be incapable of judicial cognizance; but
still the criterion was always injury to property or to property rights") ; Ex
parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 145, 226 S. W. 936, 938 (192o) ; Gee v. Pritchard,
2 Swanst. 428 (Eng. 1818).
'Stark v. Hamilton, Pavesich v. N. E. Life Insurance Co., Itzkovitch v.
Whitaker, all smpra note I.
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of suitable legislative measures ' would at once secure the protection of personal
rights and obviate the necessity of further judicial legerdemain. In the principal
case, the court reached the only possible conclusion under the present state of
the law in New York. It is submitted, however that the distinction between
personal and property rights which has been so persistently and sedulously maintained is purely arbitrary and is contrary to the dictates of natural justice by
which courts of equity ought to be governed!
FRAU-MIsRFPRESENrA.TION OF LAW AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES MARRrAE-Plaintiff and defendant, in 1911, agreed to marry. Plaintiff had been in
this country only two years and was ignorant of American customs, so that
when defendant handed her a slip of paper and represented that affixing their
signatures would make them man and wife, plaintiff relied on his statement and
signed. She then lived with him as wife until 1925 when she discovered the
fraud. Held, that the misrepresentation of law was actionable. Jekshewitz v.
Groswald, 164 N. E. 609 (Mass. 1929).
In general misrepresentation of law is not actionable, the rule being said
to be based on the presumption that everybody knows the law. On this presumption every representation of the law is treated as a mere expression of
opinion There are, however, two classes of exceptions to the general rule. The
first comprises those cases in which the defendant takes advantage of his superior knowledge of the law to deceive the plaintiff;' in the second fall those
cases in which he deceives the plaintiff through the abuse of a confidential or
fiduciary relationship.' The principal case falls within both classes. The presumption of knowledge of the law, however, as applied to cases of misrepresentation, has been severely criticized both because of its spurious origin in the
maxim of criminal law that ignorance of the law excuses no one,' and because
ITEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (I911) c. 69 § 4643 (3) ; 36 and 37 Vict. c. 66, § 25(8)
(1873) ; Monson v. Taussauds' Ltd. [1894] i Q. B. 671.
I Brandeis and Warren, The Right to Privacy (i8go) 4 HARv. L. Rv. 193;
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamatio, and injuries to Personalty (i916)
29 H~Aiv. L. REv. 640.
'Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45 (875); Townsend v. Cowles, 31 Ala.
428 (I858) ; Rheingans v. Smith, i61 Cal. 362, iig Pac. 494 (i911) ; Platt v.
Scott, 6 Blackf. 389 (Ind. I843) ; Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londonderry, 4 Ch.
D. 693 (1876) ; 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JUR. (3d. ed. 1892) §§ 876, 877.
'Upton v. Tribilcock, supra note I, at 51; Fish v. Cleland, 33 Ill. 238
(1864) ; Prest v. Adams, i4z Wash. III, 252 Pac. 686 (1927) ; 2 POMEROY, op.
cit. szpra note I.
'Lehman v. Shackleford, 50 Ala. 437, 439 (1873); Busiere v. Reilly, i89
Mass. 518, 75 N. E. 958 (i9o5) ; Fisher v. Bishop, xo8 N. Y. 25, I5 N. E. 331
(i888) ; White v. Harrigan, 77 Okla. 123, i86 Pac. 224 (192o).
'Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 371, 124 N. E. 37, 41 (i919) ; Tompkins v.
Hollister, 6o Mich. 470, 27 N. W. 651 (1886).
'Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64 (1864) ; Witherington v. Eldredge, 162
N. E. 300, 303 (Mass. 1928).
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of its evident unreality. The presumption may be further assailed by an argument based on the analogy of law to certain classes of facts which, like law,
though not actually known to all persons, are equally within the reach of all
persons. Thus equity relieves against an innocent misrepresentation of the
validity of title" even though plaintiff could have fortified himself by search
beforehand. Equity, indeed, relieves against innocent misrepresentation 8 or even
a unilateral mistake of law, with fair consistency, questioning frankly in at least
one case the soundness of the traditional distinction between misrepresented law
and misrepresented fact."8 There is, moreover, a sizeable class of cases in which
statements of legal conclusions are treated as statements of fact.u Thus does
the pull away from the harsh general rule bear fruit in judicial evasion while,
nominally, the rule is followed. A frank pronouncement, on the other hand, that
misrepresented law and misrepresented fact are to be treated on precisely the
same basis would not merely bring the theory of the law into accord with the
comparatively high standard of modern business ethics, but would have the
inestimable advantage of ridding the law of another archaic concept which hinders the rendering of justice in an important class of cases.
INSURANcE-CoNDITIONS

To

REcovERY

IN

READERS'

INSURANcE-The

plaintiff sued as administratrix to recover on an insurance policy issued to the
decedent by the defendant in consideration of a small sum of money and of
the insured's agreement to continue as a regular reader of the Oakland Tribune
during the life of the policy. The plaintiff failed to prove that the decedent
lived up to his promise. Held, that performance of the agreement was not a
condition to recovery. Zimmerman v. Cont. Life Ins. Co., 279 Pac. 464 (Cal.
1929).

Of recent years the growth in the number of newspapers issuing insurance policies to their readers has been so rapid that any decision tending to
define the legal attitude toward them is not insignificant. The writer's investigation of representative newspaper policies showed that the paper enters
into an agreement with an insurance company whereby the latter agrees to
issue policies to the former's readers at reduced rates, and the paper agrees
I See note (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 307, 311; also i BiGELow, THE LAW

OF FRAUD (i888) 487, where, however, the presumption is said to rest on the
feeling that a representation of law by a layman should be treated as mere opinion because of a layman's lack of legal knowledge.
'Busiere v. Reilly, supra note 3; Tyson v. Passmore, 2 Pa. 122 (1845);
King v. Doolittle, i Head 77 (Tenn. I858).
'Bingham v. Bingham, i Ves. (Sen.) 126, 27 English Reports 934 (1748);
Jordan v. Stevens, 51 Me. 78 (1863) ; Tyson v. Passmore, supra note 7.
'Broughton v. Hutt, 3 D. & J. 5o, 44 English Reports 1361 (i858).
" Culbreath v. Culbreath, s=pra note 6.
'Brown v. Rice, 26 Grat. 467 (Va. 1875), in which defendant secured a
bond by representing certain notes of plaintiff's decedent to be legally binding;
Harris-Emery Co. v. Pitcairn, x22 Iowa 595, 98 N. W. 476 (1904), in which
plaintiff was induced to take an insurance policy by misrepresentation of the
powers of the company; Myers v. Lowery, 46 Cal. App. 682, i89 Pac. 793
(i92o), in which a hospital was falsely represented as meeting the requirements
of the State Board.
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to carry on the clerical work at its own expense, and to turn over to the
insurance company the entire amount collected from the insured. The publication relies on increased sales to cover its expenses, and, in the majority of
cases, exacts from the insured, in addition to his agreement to continue as a
regular reader, either the taking of a new subscription or the continuation of
an old one. The advertising value of the increased use of a product has long
been recognized at law as a valid consideration, 1 and it would seem clear that
the agreement to continue as a reader, as in the principal case, must necessarily
be the major consideration moving the paper to carry out its share of the
proceedings and to in turn induce the insurance company to enter the contract. It is, however, a well-established principle of law that any ambiguity
in policies will be construed against the insurance company,2 and that courts
will further tend to avoid making a condition of a term immaterial to the risk
But where a promise, either material or immaterial to the risk, is clearly intended
as a condition, even the boldest court hesitates to rob it of its meaning," and,
granting the insured the benefit of any possible doubt, and taking into full consideration a natural disinclination on the part of the court to define so broad a
term as "regular reader," it would seem obvious that the intention was to make
a condition of the agreement in the principal case. One must, therefore, deplore
the decision as inconsistent with the recognized rules of contract law and with
common justice, and as discouraging a form of insurance convenient to the many.
INSURANCF--NEcESSITY OF INSURABLE INTEREST WHERE INSURED PROCURES POLIcY-In procuring a life insurance policy, the insured designated
as beneficiary an intimate friend who had no insurable interest; the insured
paid the premiums, the beneficiary remaining ignorant of the policy for two
years after issuance. Held, that the policy is void as to the beneficiary, who
holds the proceeds as trustee for the benefit of those legally entitled to same.
Finn v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., I6 S. W. (2d) 922 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929).

SCarlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] i Q. B. 256.
'Nat Bank v. Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 673 (877); Mouler v. Am. Life Ins.
Co., iM U. S. 335, 4 Sup. Ct. 466 (884); Ala. Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 8o Ala. 467, 2 So. 125 (1887).
'Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, i2o U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. 5oo (1887);
Ala. Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Johnston, supra note 2; Vivar v. Knights of Pythias, 52 N. J. L. 455, 2o Atl. 36 (i89O).
' Brady v. United Life Ins. Ass'n., 6o Fed. 727 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894). Northcm Ins. Co. v. Morris, 165 N. E. 5o6 (Ohio 1929). Cf. Burritt v. Ins. Co.,
5 Hill 188 (N. Y. 1843), in which the court laid down the rule that where the
assertions or representations upon which a contract is declared to be based
are warranties, they must be "strictly true, or the policy will not take effect;
and this is so whether the thing warranted be material to the risk or not. It
would, perhaps, be more proper to say that the parties have agreed on the
materiality of the thing warranted, and that the agreement precludes all inquiry into the subject."
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It is a general principle' that a person may procure insurance upon his
own life and make it payable to whom he will, regardless of whether or not
the beneficiary has an insurable interest.' The Texas rule effects a contradiction of the prevailing doctrine, the court in the principal case drawing a mistaken analogy between the facts at issue and the situation in which one person
attempts to insure the life of another. The contract of insurance in the latter
instance is invalid 3 where insurable interest is lacking, due to two considerations
o~f public policy: opposition to speculative contracts or wagers on human life;
and refusal to provide a beneficiary with incentive to hasten the death of the
insured. However, these considerations are not involved where the insured
procures the policy: in the absence of evidence it is not reasonable to presume
that a man is gambling upon the duration of his own life merely to benefit
another, or that he is voluntarily investing his funds under circumstances
which create an inducement to murder him.! It is this confidence in the insured which probably causes the prevailing view to hold that such policy is
sustained by the interest which every insured has in his own life? However,
the contract must not be evasive of the law, or a cover for a wager. It must
be procured in good faith, and whether the insured or the beneficiary pays
the premiums is important evidence o.f the fact. Thus, the policy will not be
sustained where the beneficiary induces the insured to procure the insurance
and to pay the premiums;' or where the insured is only nominally the contracting party, the beneficiary having in reality procured the insurance and
paid the premiums. 8 Nevertheless, the beneficiary may recover where he pays
of the transaction is unquestionable? The fact in the principal case that the
beneficiary had no knowledge of the policy is also evidence of good faith be'Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457 (1876) ; Welch v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 748 (igig); Buckner v. Ridgely Protective Ass'n, 131 Wash. 174,

229

Pac. 313 (1924).

'Insurable interest is generally defined as arising from the pecuniary
relations of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of or surety
for the acts of the independent contractor; the other, with which the principal
for the insured, or from ties of consanguinity or affinity which justify a reasonable expectation of advantage from the continuance of the life insured. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 (i881).
aConn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, supra note i; Dresen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 Ill. App. 292 (1917) ; United Security Life Ins. &
T. Co. of Pa. v. Brown,
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Pa. 264, 113 Atl. 443 (1921).

v. Commonwealth Ben. Assn., 98 N. J. L. 267, II8 Atl. 449
'VANCE, INSURANCE (1904)

Contra: Howard
(1922).

128.

'Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Cummings, 4 Fed. (2d) 794, (C. C.

A. 3d, 1925) ; Haberfeld v. Mayer, 256 Pa. 151, ioo Atl. 587 (1917).

Decisions

do not theorize upon the point, despite the fact that accepted definitions o.f
the requisite "interest" contemplate a relationship between two or more individuals.
'Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Cummings, supra note 5.
"See Morgan v. Segenfelter, 127 Ky. 348, 352, 105 S. W. 476, 477 (1907).
8 See Amick v. Butler, iii Ind. 578, 583, 12 N. E. 518, 520 (1887).
the premiums after the insured fails to do so, provided that the good faith
8
Mutual Aid Union v. White, 166 Ark. 467, 267 S. W. 137 (1925) ; Burdette v. Columbus Mutual Life Ins. Co., 8o W. Va. 384, 93 S. E. 366 (1917).
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tween the parties, which would have been considered in any other jurisdiction. '
It is submitted that the Texas doctrine' destroys the intention of the insured
without justification: logically, in view of the false analogy previously noted;
practically, since experience in other jurisdictions establishes that the incentive "to take the life of another" feared by the court in the principal case is
an imaginary evil.
LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-LIABILITY

COVENANT TO REPAIR FOR DAMAGES

or

LANDLORD

TO

TENANT

OCCASIONED BY NEGLIGENCE

UNDER

OF INDEPEN-

CONTRACTOR-A landlord obligated himself "to refinish all walls" in the
demised apartment. To this end he employed an independent contractor, who
failed to protect tenant's furniture from paint-droppings. He!d, that the landlord is liable to the tenant. Clark v. Engelhardt, i2o So. 498 (La. 1929).
As in the principal case, the making of repairs on leased premises is frequently committed by the landlord to an independent contractor, and in such
case the question arises whether the landlord is liable for damage to his tenant's property caused by the negligence of the contractor. The general rule' is
that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the relation between
employer and independent contractor, if the employer selects a competent
contractor, and the work entrusted to him is not inherently dangerous.- There
are two distinct lines of cases dealing with the situation presented in the principal one. One' applies this general doctrine of non-liability of the employer
for the acts of the independent contractor; the other, with which the principal
case is in harmony, appears to hinge peculiarly on landlord-tenant relationship,
whereby the landlord is liable for the misconduct of the independent contractor. These later cases' seem to recognize some absolute duty owed by
the landlord to the tenant' as to the condition of the premises which renders
DENT

"ON. A. Life Ins. Co. v. Craigen, 13 Can. Sup. Ct. 278 (1886).
'The Texas rule is firmly established by the instant decision, which failed
to cite and explain Gibson v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 294 S. W. 923
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927) approving the prevailing doctrine, commented upon in
Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Adamson, 24 Fed. (2d) 712 (N. D. Tex. 1928).
MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1917, n. 3.
'This rule, however, is subject to certain well recognized exceptions, set
forth in 2 MECHEm § 1918.
'Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586 (1873) (decision by a single judge
as an arbitrator) ; Jefferson v. Morse Co., 165 Ill138, 46 N. E. 272 (1897) ;
Meany v. Abbott, 6 Phila. 256 (Pa. 1867) ; Blake v. Woolf, [18981 2 Q. B. 426.
'Nahm v. Register Newspaper Co., 120 Ky. 485, 87 S. W. 296 (igo5);
Covington v. Masonic Temple Co., 176 Ky. 729, 197 S.W. 420 (1917); Peerless Mfg. Co. v. Bagley, 126 Mich. 225, 85 N. W. 568 (igoi); Brickley v.
Luce, 148 Mich. 223, III N. W. 752 (19o7); Vollrath v. Stevens, 199 Mo. App.
5, 202 S.W. 283 (1918) ; Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573, 70 N. W. 824
(1897).
'An investigation of the cases fails to disclose the precise theory upon
which the landlord's liability is predicated. In Vollrath v. Stevens, supra note
4, at 13, 202 S. W. at 286, it is said, ". . . a duty is cast upon him (the
landlord) to see that the repairs are made so as not to injure the tenant, and
the rule concerning independent contractor has no application." In the Peerless Case, supra note 4, at 229, 85 N. W. at 569, the following language is
'2
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the former liable for all the acts of an independent contractor employed by
him. These decisions imposing liability on the landlord do so without bringing the case within any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule of
immunity from liability for a contractor's acts. From a strict agency viewpoint it appears anomalous to hold the landlord liable in such a case, as there
seems to be no basis in logic or law for the exceptional rule of vicarious responsibility imposed in the instant case.
SuSETysHn-RIGHT OF SURETY TO BE SUBROGATED TO STATE'S IGHTS OF
PRIORITY-PENNSYLvANIA DEVIATION FRoM COMMON LAW RULE-Surety paid

amount of commonwealth's deposit in insolvent bank under bond securing deposit Held, that such surety cannot be subrogated to commonwealth's right of
priority over other depositors. In re South Phila.State Bank's Insolvency, 2§95
Pa. 433, i45 Atl. 520 (1929).
Just as in the Roman law,' early in the i8th century it became the accepted
practice of the English court of exchequer first by specific order or consent of
the crown,' then by virtue of equitable principles alone,' and later by statute' to
place sureties who paid a debt due the crown in the situation of the crown.
This principle of subrogating the surety to all the rights of the government, including that of priority, has practically without exception been followed by
those states in this country which have adopted the rule of the state's right to
priority and which have adjudicated the issue of the instant case.! The federal
government has attained the rule by means of statute, under which many cases
have since been decided.' The principal case, therefore, together with a weak
used, without showing how the "absolute duty" is created,--"where one owes
an absolute duty to another, he cannot acquit himself of liability by delegating
that duty to an independent contractor." Other cases reach the same result by
saying that the covenant to repair is a personal one and cannot be delegated,
Eberson v. Continental Investment Co., 118 Mo. App. 67, 93 S. W. 297 (i9o6) ;
cf. SALmoND, TORTS (7th ed. 1928) i38 ". . . if the duty is merely one of
exercising due care, he on whom the duty is imposed does not in ordinary cases
delegate his duty, but actually performs it, when he employs a competent independent contractor to do the work. To do the work personally instead of
through a contractor who is a competent expert, will not be due care, but
negligence."
'HARRIS, THE LAW OF SUBROGATION (I889) § 306.
QReg. v. Doughty (Eng. 1702) reported in notes to Rex v. Bennett, I
Wight. 1, 145 Eng. Reprint 1152 (18io); Rex v. Bennett, ibid. Many text

writers and judges some of whom are cited disapprovingly in the principal case
feel that even these cases have as their basis equitable principles.
'In re Churchill, 39 Ch. Div. 174 (i888).
'MERCANTH.E LAW AMENDMENT AcT, 19 & 2o VicT. c. 97, § 5 (I856).
Aetna Accid. & Liab. Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, 170 Pac. 76o (1918);
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Carnegie Trust Co., i61 App. Div. 429, 146
N. Y. Supp. 804 (1914); Woodyard v. Sayre, go W. Va. 295, iio S. E. 689

(Ig=).
"I

STAT.

31 U. S. C. § 193 (1926).
24 A. L. R. 1502.

676 (799),

statute, see note (1923)

For cases arising under
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Michigan dichoui,' constitutes the sole basis for what, in contrast with the great
weight of authority, may now be termed the Pennsylvania Rule. Of especial interest, however, is the hypothetical case which the court fears occurring and
which would seem to have had no little influence on the court in the determining
of its decision in the principal case. In the case assumed, both the debtor of the
commonwealth and the surety become insolvent, the latter paying only one-half
the principal debt to the state. The court feels that if the majority rule were
adopted, the state and the surety would, in such a situation, come into conflict
with each other, to the possible prejudice of the commonwealth. It is difficult, however, to see how such a contingency could occur, since it is one of
equity's most fundamental concepts, as well as almost universal law as applied to
the particular situation of the hypothetical case, that subrogation will never
be allowed the surety to the prejudice of the creditor! A possible alternative
under the rule of the principal case would still seem to remain whereby sureties
might indirectly secure the advantage of the state's right to priority, i. e., by the
use of "contracts of indemnity," under which the indemnitor would merely agree
to reimburse the state to the extent of its loss after the state had first exhausted
its remedies against the insolvent bank, rather than the usual surety contract,
under which the surety would first pay the state the amount of its deposit and
then itself, subrogated to the state's rights, proceed against the bank for the full
amount. Should a case under such a contract arise, a loophole would still be left
the Pennsylvania court to enforce the effect of its decision in the form of a
minority rule at present extant in a few jurisdictions which holds that the requiring of security for state funds or the procuring of such protection, automatically acts as a waiver of the state's right to priority. The effect of the
decision of the principal case on the courts of other jurisdictions is, of course,
still untested, but in general, it hardly seems probable that there will be any
marked movement in the direction of the Pennsylvania doctrine. The majority
rule seems too firmly entrenched for that.
Comm. of Banking v. Chelsea Saving Bank, I6i Mich. 69i, 704, 125 N. W.
424 8(Ig).

Knaffl v. Knoxville Banking & Trust Co., 133 Tenn. 655, x82 S. W. 232
(I915) ; SHELDON, SUBROGATION (893) § 127; 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURIS. (4th
ed. i919) § 2350. For cases showing that even under statute granting subrogation, surety cannot acquire rights detrimental to or in competition with government, see U. S. v. Nat'l Surety Co., 254 U. S. 73, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 29 (192O).
For cases showing that even if surety is liable for only part of debt, and pays
that part, he cannot be subrogated until whole demand of creditor is satisfied,
see SHELDON, mtpra, particularly case in note 3, at p. 191.
°National Surety Co. v. Pixton, 6o Utah 289, 208 Pac. 878 (1922) ; In re
Central Bank of Willcox. 23 Ariz. 574, 205 Pac. 915 (1922).

